RC 1/16 M-24 Chaffee light tank- Dien Bien Phu 1954 - Build
Posted: Wed Nov 24, 2021 12:42 am
Hi everyone,
As i await parts to finish the M-113 Lynx, its time to start a more complex build, a 1/16 M-24 Chaffee light tank as used by the French Army in the first Indochina War. Ten M-24 Chaffee, named Shaffee by the French were used at Dien Bien Phu, a dramatic battle that will provide the back ground for this build. I find that builds that focus on a specific tank used at a specific battle are very interesting and creates a better bond between the builder and the model, considering the work, time and money involved.
The M24 Chaffee in Indochina, perfectly adapted to the terrain, robust with excellent performance, armor and fire power. One of his main weakness during battle were the batteries, always overused and at risk of being drained. Crews has to rotate the turret with the manual crank and turn off the ventilation fan in order to maintain enough essential power, considerably degrading the crews comfort.
This specific M-24 below has T72E1 tracks and the mounts for the dozer blade. Another reference indicate these are mounting for a flotation device. I am skeptical as i have not seen any photographic evidence of both in operation. Looks like pretty strong mounts for a flotation device.
Following the build of the Churchill Mk III tank at Dieppe, i have to admit that i now have a soft spot for doomed battles where tank men fought against all odds and mainly for survival. Dien Bien Phu falls into this category.
First, a brief historical summary of the battle of Dien Bien Phu.
Feeling that they were loosing a guerilla war that had lasted already 8 years, the French high command had the idea in 1953 to create the conditions where Viet Minh forces could be directly engaged in a conventional battle where French superior firepower would destroy them.
The location chosen for the base was the plain of Dien Bien Phu, a monsoon-affected valley surrounded by heavily wooded hills that had not been secured. The cream of the French forces, its elite paratrooper units, would be air dropped to create defensive positions supported by heavy weapons (60 artillery pieces of different calibre, four Quad 4 mounts, and ten M24 Chaffee light tanks) and await the enemy. The base would also provide a position to launch operations in the surrounding areas once the base is reinforced with other units.
Timelines are as follow;
- December 1953 to late February 1954; Operation Castor to take over Dien Bien Phu and build up of forces on both sides.
- March 1954 to May 1954: day and night battle and then capitulation of French forces on May 7.
- July; Geneva conference peace treaty for Indochina.
- September 1954: release of surviving Dien Bien Phu prisoners.
Looking at this map below, we can easily see that creating a forward operating base of 15,000 men so far from its support bases of Hanoi and Haiphong was not a good idea. Considering the French Air forces weakness in heavy transport planes and that the roads to Laos were under the control of the Viet Minh, risks were extremely high. If it difficult to understand how these forces would eventually be pulled out.
The French forces in Indochina had a large contingent of Vietnamese allies and also troops from their African colonies. It is also well known that the French Foreign Legion had a large percentage of Germans. Let's remember that this was 1954, most of the WW2 veterans were long gone. Germany was not allowed to have an army yet at the time so for any German that wanted a life in the military, the French Foreign legion was a clear choice.
The plain itself is surrounded by hills. There was no defensive perimeter. The French created instead a series of strong points located on hills that could technically support each other in case of attack. The strong points were given women names like Huguette, Gabrielle, Dominique, Elianne... apparently the names of the commander's mistresses. Two airstrips, build by the Japanese during WW2, would be used for resupply and the base would also have a few Bearcats attack aircrafts.
View of the landscape outside of the valley. It provided cover for the Viet Minh build up that lasted months prior to the battle, eventually totalling 60,000 men. The French patrols sent as recon into the surrounding jungle were attacked, heavily engaged and had to retreat, the garrison was encircled. The only natural water resource going though the valley, the Nam Yum River, was polluted by the Viet Minh with dead animal carcasses. Another miscalculation by the French, the Viet Minh was able to transport 200 artillery pieces of various calibre, up to 105mm howitzers, through the jungle and hide them behind hills where they could not be found or destroyed by French counter artillery. The Viet Minh observers could see everything the French were doing down in the valley, spot targets and direct artillery fire with pin point accuracy.
View of the Dien Bien Phu valley from a hill "strong point" protected by thin laid barb wire good enough to hold cattle... The valley is huge and the garrison was obviously dispersed in multiple small positions. The Viet Minh could therefore pick their battle, attack individual small garrisons one at a time, exhausting the French reserves in futile counter attacks up hill.
Mostly devoid of trees and rocks, the landscape provided little material for the construction of fortifications. Only barb wire could be flown in. The on site commander, Colonel de Castries, did not give orders to fortify the camp correctly, other than for his own bunker... The poor de Castries, a simple Colonel, was put in charge of the garrison that would eventually reach 15,000 men and was way over his head. Managing the defense would have required an elite high command, but it was not existing. At the start of the battle, many units were still in tents. Shallow trenches were dug in dirt and did not provide much cover for the heavy Viet Minh artillery barrage that would be unleashed on the garrison. Then the rain started...
Positions around the main airfield was heavily bombed and initial light fortification work were easily destroyed. Wrecked planes lay on the tarmac. Soon after the start of the battle, only air drops could be made to resupply the base, many of which fell to the Viet Minh, including one with a set of aerial photographs intended for the French commander that provided the enemy with a detailed view of all the French positions. Helicopter landing to pick up the wounded also became impossible due to AA.
During the build up, ten brand new M-24 Chaffee tanks, code-named Bisons, were airlifted in parts and re-assembled on site. They provided the only mobile forces of the base, split in three platoons, two in the central position and one became isolated at Isabelle. They were used piecemeal as individual fire fighter units during the whole siege, supporting garrisons during attacks, leading counter attacks to retake positions, rescue survivors, and eventually all ten were damaged and then destroyed. They provided extremely valuable services and their presence was a real moral booster for the infantry. Mobile M16 halftracks with .50 calibre quad mounts would have been equally useful but the French only brought in a few static mounts. I am guessing that the M16 would not have lasted long once spotted by the enemy artillery observers.
The Viet Minh destroyed each strong point piecemeal one after another. French counter attacks supported by the tanks did retake many strong points but with most of its individual local garrison dead or wounded, positions held by a few men with dead officers could not be reinforced and had to be abandoned.
Paratrooper units or individuals sent as reinforcement with no hopes of coming back might not have eaten or slept for 24 hours prior to the night jump. Some landed in the middle of firefights or bombardments and were assigned no bunkers, water or food, and sent asap to hold an area, or strait into battle against waves of Viet Minh infantry. Losses were insupportable. The attempts by the paratrooper mafia (ie Bigeard) to take things over was too late. There would never be enough paratroopers to save Dien Bien Phu and stop the meat grinder...
In the end, after two months of engagement, exhausted and out of resources, with thousands of wounded to take care, the French forces surrendered. About 2,000 French had died, thousands sick or wounded and between 4000 and 8000 Viet Minh were killed. About 12,000 men of the French forces then went into captivity. Captured Vietnamese were treated as traitors, pulled aside and executed. The men were weak after months in the ditches, the rain and half rations. Food before and after capitulation was scarce. The Viet only allowed critical wounded to be evacuated by air. The rest were fed two balls of rice per day and made to march hundreds of km to prison camps. After 4 months of captivity, 9000 had died of disease, neglect and starvation. A dark chapter of French history had ended.
Conclusions:
The French high command Hedgehog (Siege warfare) strategy formulated by Navarre and Berteil for Dien Bien Phu were theories lacking any sense of reality. Dien Bien Phu could not have worked, the French lacked the means to achieve success, they did not control the high grounds, they mainly under-estimated the Viet Minh capabilities while overestimating their own. Worse, the Americans later tried the same strategy at Khe Sanh. A force of 6000 Marines was dropped on a hill in the middle of nowhere. Well, at least they had the high ground. After the North Vietnamese had assembled four divisions in the hope of creating an American Dien Bien Phu. The shelling of the base started and Khe Sanh was quickly surrounded and isolated. The US Air Force then launched "Operation Niagara", dropping 100,000 tons of bombs on the surrounding jungle (tonnage differs depending on sources but averaging 60 B-52 strikes and 350 fighter bomber strikes daily), plus Army support with total of 158,000 artillery rounds. It is estimated that the North Vietnamese lost between 9000 and 13000 combatants at Khe Sahn, likely less in reality, at the cost of 3,500 US and allied forces killed in associated battles and relief attempts during a 5 months period. Despite all the resources available to the US, Khe Sahn had a very similar kill ratio and achievement as the French at Dien Bien Phu. The Marines could and abandoned the base once they had had enough (an important difference with Dien Bien Phu), but the enemy shelling never stopped throughout the battle. The American had the means for such attrition strategy but it was not worth the cost. Multiple tons of bombs were used for every enemy killed. The Siege strategy of Dien Bien Phu was proven to be ineffective no matter the amount of resources and technology involved. In the end, it changed nothing because success is also measured in politics. The general in charge (Westmoreland) was replaced and the fighting moved elsewhere... same story.
Each of the ten Chaffee had a name, sometimes forts, decorated soldiers or old Napoleonic battles like Pozen, Smolensk, Auerstaedt or Douaumont, or Bazeilles. I have decided to create the mount of the tank unit commander Captain Hervouët, named Conti.
Continuing on following post.
As i await parts to finish the M-113 Lynx, its time to start a more complex build, a 1/16 M-24 Chaffee light tank as used by the French Army in the first Indochina War. Ten M-24 Chaffee, named Shaffee by the French were used at Dien Bien Phu, a dramatic battle that will provide the back ground for this build. I find that builds that focus on a specific tank used at a specific battle are very interesting and creates a better bond between the builder and the model, considering the work, time and money involved.
The M24 Chaffee in Indochina, perfectly adapted to the terrain, robust with excellent performance, armor and fire power. One of his main weakness during battle were the batteries, always overused and at risk of being drained. Crews has to rotate the turret with the manual crank and turn off the ventilation fan in order to maintain enough essential power, considerably degrading the crews comfort.
This specific M-24 below has T72E1 tracks and the mounts for the dozer blade. Another reference indicate these are mounting for a flotation device. I am skeptical as i have not seen any photographic evidence of both in operation. Looks like pretty strong mounts for a flotation device.
Following the build of the Churchill Mk III tank at Dieppe, i have to admit that i now have a soft spot for doomed battles where tank men fought against all odds and mainly for survival. Dien Bien Phu falls into this category.
First, a brief historical summary of the battle of Dien Bien Phu.
Feeling that they were loosing a guerilla war that had lasted already 8 years, the French high command had the idea in 1953 to create the conditions where Viet Minh forces could be directly engaged in a conventional battle where French superior firepower would destroy them.
The location chosen for the base was the plain of Dien Bien Phu, a monsoon-affected valley surrounded by heavily wooded hills that had not been secured. The cream of the French forces, its elite paratrooper units, would be air dropped to create defensive positions supported by heavy weapons (60 artillery pieces of different calibre, four Quad 4 mounts, and ten M24 Chaffee light tanks) and await the enemy. The base would also provide a position to launch operations in the surrounding areas once the base is reinforced with other units.
Timelines are as follow;
- December 1953 to late February 1954; Operation Castor to take over Dien Bien Phu and build up of forces on both sides.
- March 1954 to May 1954: day and night battle and then capitulation of French forces on May 7.
- July; Geneva conference peace treaty for Indochina.
- September 1954: release of surviving Dien Bien Phu prisoners.
Looking at this map below, we can easily see that creating a forward operating base of 15,000 men so far from its support bases of Hanoi and Haiphong was not a good idea. Considering the French Air forces weakness in heavy transport planes and that the roads to Laos were under the control of the Viet Minh, risks were extremely high. If it difficult to understand how these forces would eventually be pulled out.
The French forces in Indochina had a large contingent of Vietnamese allies and also troops from their African colonies. It is also well known that the French Foreign Legion had a large percentage of Germans. Let's remember that this was 1954, most of the WW2 veterans were long gone. Germany was not allowed to have an army yet at the time so for any German that wanted a life in the military, the French Foreign legion was a clear choice.
The plain itself is surrounded by hills. There was no defensive perimeter. The French created instead a series of strong points located on hills that could technically support each other in case of attack. The strong points were given women names like Huguette, Gabrielle, Dominique, Elianne... apparently the names of the commander's mistresses. Two airstrips, build by the Japanese during WW2, would be used for resupply and the base would also have a few Bearcats attack aircrafts.
View of the landscape outside of the valley. It provided cover for the Viet Minh build up that lasted months prior to the battle, eventually totalling 60,000 men. The French patrols sent as recon into the surrounding jungle were attacked, heavily engaged and had to retreat, the garrison was encircled. The only natural water resource going though the valley, the Nam Yum River, was polluted by the Viet Minh with dead animal carcasses. Another miscalculation by the French, the Viet Minh was able to transport 200 artillery pieces of various calibre, up to 105mm howitzers, through the jungle and hide them behind hills where they could not be found or destroyed by French counter artillery. The Viet Minh observers could see everything the French were doing down in the valley, spot targets and direct artillery fire with pin point accuracy.
View of the Dien Bien Phu valley from a hill "strong point" protected by thin laid barb wire good enough to hold cattle... The valley is huge and the garrison was obviously dispersed in multiple small positions. The Viet Minh could therefore pick their battle, attack individual small garrisons one at a time, exhausting the French reserves in futile counter attacks up hill.
Mostly devoid of trees and rocks, the landscape provided little material for the construction of fortifications. Only barb wire could be flown in. The on site commander, Colonel de Castries, did not give orders to fortify the camp correctly, other than for his own bunker... The poor de Castries, a simple Colonel, was put in charge of the garrison that would eventually reach 15,000 men and was way over his head. Managing the defense would have required an elite high command, but it was not existing. At the start of the battle, many units were still in tents. Shallow trenches were dug in dirt and did not provide much cover for the heavy Viet Minh artillery barrage that would be unleashed on the garrison. Then the rain started...
Positions around the main airfield was heavily bombed and initial light fortification work were easily destroyed. Wrecked planes lay on the tarmac. Soon after the start of the battle, only air drops could be made to resupply the base, many of which fell to the Viet Minh, including one with a set of aerial photographs intended for the French commander that provided the enemy with a detailed view of all the French positions. Helicopter landing to pick up the wounded also became impossible due to AA.
During the build up, ten brand new M-24 Chaffee tanks, code-named Bisons, were airlifted in parts and re-assembled on site. They provided the only mobile forces of the base, split in three platoons, two in the central position and one became isolated at Isabelle. They were used piecemeal as individual fire fighter units during the whole siege, supporting garrisons during attacks, leading counter attacks to retake positions, rescue survivors, and eventually all ten were damaged and then destroyed. They provided extremely valuable services and their presence was a real moral booster for the infantry. Mobile M16 halftracks with .50 calibre quad mounts would have been equally useful but the French only brought in a few static mounts. I am guessing that the M16 would not have lasted long once spotted by the enemy artillery observers.
The Viet Minh destroyed each strong point piecemeal one after another. French counter attacks supported by the tanks did retake many strong points but with most of its individual local garrison dead or wounded, positions held by a few men with dead officers could not be reinforced and had to be abandoned.
Paratrooper units or individuals sent as reinforcement with no hopes of coming back might not have eaten or slept for 24 hours prior to the night jump. Some landed in the middle of firefights or bombardments and were assigned no bunkers, water or food, and sent asap to hold an area, or strait into battle against waves of Viet Minh infantry. Losses were insupportable. The attempts by the paratrooper mafia (ie Bigeard) to take things over was too late. There would never be enough paratroopers to save Dien Bien Phu and stop the meat grinder...
In the end, after two months of engagement, exhausted and out of resources, with thousands of wounded to take care, the French forces surrendered. About 2,000 French had died, thousands sick or wounded and between 4000 and 8000 Viet Minh were killed. About 12,000 men of the French forces then went into captivity. Captured Vietnamese were treated as traitors, pulled aside and executed. The men were weak after months in the ditches, the rain and half rations. Food before and after capitulation was scarce. The Viet only allowed critical wounded to be evacuated by air. The rest were fed two balls of rice per day and made to march hundreds of km to prison camps. After 4 months of captivity, 9000 had died of disease, neglect and starvation. A dark chapter of French history had ended.
Conclusions:
The French high command Hedgehog (Siege warfare) strategy formulated by Navarre and Berteil for Dien Bien Phu were theories lacking any sense of reality. Dien Bien Phu could not have worked, the French lacked the means to achieve success, they did not control the high grounds, they mainly under-estimated the Viet Minh capabilities while overestimating their own. Worse, the Americans later tried the same strategy at Khe Sanh. A force of 6000 Marines was dropped on a hill in the middle of nowhere. Well, at least they had the high ground. After the North Vietnamese had assembled four divisions in the hope of creating an American Dien Bien Phu. The shelling of the base started and Khe Sanh was quickly surrounded and isolated. The US Air Force then launched "Operation Niagara", dropping 100,000 tons of bombs on the surrounding jungle (tonnage differs depending on sources but averaging 60 B-52 strikes and 350 fighter bomber strikes daily), plus Army support with total of 158,000 artillery rounds. It is estimated that the North Vietnamese lost between 9000 and 13000 combatants at Khe Sahn, likely less in reality, at the cost of 3,500 US and allied forces killed in associated battles and relief attempts during a 5 months period. Despite all the resources available to the US, Khe Sahn had a very similar kill ratio and achievement as the French at Dien Bien Phu. The Marines could and abandoned the base once they had had enough (an important difference with Dien Bien Phu), but the enemy shelling never stopped throughout the battle. The American had the means for such attrition strategy but it was not worth the cost. Multiple tons of bombs were used for every enemy killed. The Siege strategy of Dien Bien Phu was proven to be ineffective no matter the amount of resources and technology involved. In the end, it changed nothing because success is also measured in politics. The general in charge (Westmoreland) was replaced and the fighting moved elsewhere... same story.
Each of the ten Chaffee had a name, sometimes forts, decorated soldiers or old Napoleonic battles like Pozen, Smolensk, Auerstaedt or Douaumont, or Bazeilles. I have decided to create the mount of the tank unit commander Captain Hervouët, named Conti.
Continuing on following post.